This second report focuses on the social impacts of migration in the context of the increasing politicization and contestation of migration. It is argued that Population Geography could engage in more effective ways with political debates of migration. A call is made for Population Geography to more readily provide robust evidence to shape debates, such as Brexit, and to inform the salience of 'raging comments' based on representations of migration as a harbinger of detrimental changes to local neighbourhoods.
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I Introduction
In my previous report (Smith, 2018a) , I highlighted work on population geographies of human trafficking. Connected, in part, to this scholarship, I want in this report to concentrate on population geographical research that has progressed understandings of the social impacts of migration. One of the 1 The title is inspired by Castles et al. (1993) .
reasons for this focus is that the social effects of migration have been ratcheted-up as a grand public policy challenge for twenty-first century societies (Smith et al., 2016) .
In the oft-cited 'age of migration', the transformative effects of contemporary migration on communities and neighbourhoods have vogue within media and political channels (Caviedes, 2015) . Prevalent within many discourses are representations of migration as a cause of detrimental social change, tied to the consequences of increasing flows of unregulated population movements within and across national boundaries (Coleman and Stuesse, 2016) . This is coupled to 'raging comments' for the strict control of migration in national policies, to halt or reduce overall rates of migration. Contrarily, there are, positive discourses of migration, which espouse virtues such as socio-cultural enrichment from diverse populations, and the economic benefits from lowercost, flexible labour of migrant populations (Favell, 2016) .
In this melee of contestation, the paucity of empirical substantiations of the scale and effects of migration must be acknowledged. To date, the accuracy of some narratives of migration have not been effectively refuted or reaffirmed by scholarship. This is influenced by the absence of annual, up-to-date, (inter)national datasets that provide precise information on the flows and characteristics of migrants. National decadal census datasets are crosssectional, for example, and do not allow the comparison of annual trends.
There are substantial 'black holes' within migration datasets over every decade, which have not been fully plugged by alternative datasets, such as International Passenger surveys (Rees, 2017) . As a result, spatial and temporal mappings and comprehensive analyses of migration flows, including net, internal, and out-migration of social groups, are lacking.
These challenges intersect with thematic and methodological interests of Population Geography, and warrant the attention of the sub-discipline.
Providing a fuller evidence-base of migration would enable the sub-discipline to have more impact on political, media and policy debates. As Boyle (2016) contends, Population Geography was silent in the debates of the Brexit referendum; despite 'leave' and 'remain' schools of thought contesting the effects of migration on social change (Wadsworth et al., 2016) .
It would be a step-in-the-right direction to more fully expose local population compositions and changes in places that are, at least anecdotally, viewed as being transformed by migration. Although it might not be possible to pin down, in an accurate way, flows and characteristics of migration on an annual basis, it may be possible to identify overall population changes, and consider other factors for the transformation of local neighbourhood populations (such as fertility and ageing).
In the remainder of this report, recent Population Geography scholarship from the USA and UK is highlighted that has progressed knowledge of broader compositional changes to local population geographies. It is argued that this is important to more fully frame the effects of migration on social change, and offers the potential for Population Geography to inform political and policy debates such as Brexit. The discussion concludes with possible questions and future directions of travel for Population Geography in this field of study.
II Changing population geographies and contemporary migration
According to some high profile commentators, migration is a harbinger of changing neighbourhood identities and senses of place. This view is often underpinned by vivid descriptions of migrant households settling in distinct residential enclaves, and imposing seemingly 'invasive' norms, lifestyles, living arrangements and ways of life within these neighbourhoods. Ostensible, dominant markers of migrant-led changes include expressions of unfamiliar:
(foreign) languages; dress, music and embodiments; cultural consumption and related signage on streets (food and grocery shops, restaurants and cafes), and; religious institutions and festivals. It is claimed that established populations feel 'out of place' and 'othered', as rising proportions of migrant populations transfigure the overall ambience and 'feeling of the neighbourhood' (Meier, 2017) .
It is asserted that perceptions of changing places are reinforced by migrant populations conspicuously taking-over housing, work, environments for socialising (congregating in public spaces), and placing a burden on public services (schools, hospitals, dentists, health care, benefits). Tellingly, the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP) billboard posters in 2016 (in the lead-up to the Brexit Referendum) explicitly cited changing labour market conditions for settled populations (Dennison and Goodwin, 2015) , with alarmist proclamations about the effects of immigration: '26 million people in Europe are looking for work. And whose jobs are they after?' (see Gagliardi and Lemos, 2015) .
Processes of local population change are seen to be perpetuated via the outmigration (displacement / replacement) of established populations, has they 'take flight' in the midst of perceived and real changes to disappearing cultural structures and everyday life (Kaufmann and Harris, 2015) , and feelings of loss and dispossession of belonging and attachment to place and community (Boschman and van Ham, 2015) . Framed in this way, perceptions of migration can spark social unrest and conflict, and sociospatial divisions between settled and immigrant populations (i.e. 'parallel lives'). Ultimately, migration is treated as a phenomenon that creates segregated societies ('us' and 'them'), and undermines community cohesion and socially-mixed, diverse, local populations (Lewis et al., 2015; Zwiers et al., 2017) ; contrary to more positive readings of migration.
The emotive divisions and resentment between settled and migrant populations resonate with explanations of the formation of distinctive electorate voting practices (Johnston et al., 2016a) . The exemplar of the USA Presidential election of Donald Trump (Johnston et al., 2016b) , serves to highlight this point, with commentators stating that this reflects the attitudes of well-established (working class) populations to vote for symbolic change, in part, due to anxieties tied to perceptions of migrant groups taking-over their jobs, houses, schools and hospitals (Winders, 2016; Martin, 2017) . Similar sentiments are evoked in the upsurge of votes for right-wing political parties and movements across Mainland Europe (e.g. Germany, France, Slovakia, Austria) (Halla et al., 2017) .
The Brexit referendum in 2016 illustrates how the contested effects of migrants have become increasingly politicised in the UK (Harris and Charlton, 2016; Manley et al., 2017) . Lay, media and political discourses of the Brexit referendum exemplify this point (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017) , shaped by the populist rhetoric of the UKIP (Bachmann and Sidaway, 2016) Second, there is a concern with migrants from Accession 8 European nations into markets towns in Eastern England, such as Boston and Great Yarmouth (Burrell, 2016; Trevena et al., 2013 A factor here may be that descriptive analyses of population distributions have been devalorised within the sub-discipline and beyond. It may be that Population Geography is more fixated on theorising processes of population, or sophisticating technical advances in data collection and manipulation. This may be influenced by an assumption that increasing on-line access to national datasets and user-friendly mapping software (Stillwell et al., 2015) , and the development of research arms within non-academic institutions (Stillwell, 2015) , mean that the mapping of populations is diminishing as part of remit of Population Geography (for exceptions see Lomax et al., 2014) . Perhaps, there is also an implicit view that national research councils, in an evercompetitive landscape that stipulates the need for originality, innovation and outstanding scientific merit, may not fund this type of research activity.
Another reason for the lack of engagement with the Brexit referendum may have been the relative slow delivery of outputs from analyses of the 2011 UK Census, with the key collection by population geographers only recently being published (Stillwell, 2017) . This sheds light on the effects of axes of social differences on population change, including ethnicity (e.g. Rees et al., 2017) , social class (e.g. Dorling, 2017) and family structures (e.g. Smith and Culora, 2017) , which could have shaped debates in the Brexit referendum (see also Champion et al., 2017) . Likewise, in the following section, other Population Geography scholarship is highlighted that has the potential to inform ongoing debates of the effects of migration on social change.
III. Progressing knowledge of changing population geographies
Migration scholarship within Population Geography has hooked-up with the merits of assimilation, integration, super-diversity and minority-majority theories (e.g. Crul, 2015; Kivisto, 2017) in piecemeal ways. Nevertheless, it is recognised within the sub-discipline that compositional population characteristics influence how social changes, perceived to have been caused by migration, are experienced by settled populations (Lichter et al., 2017; Heerden and Ruedin 2017). The sub-discipline is well tuned to investigate changes to compositional factors, including intersecting axes of social difference and uneven geographic patterns of ethnicity / race, religion, social class, education, lifecourse, affluence and poverty, places of origin and transit, and cultural norms. This is important given research is required to fully unpick how different forms and trajectories of local population diversity and / or homogeneity can influence (re)actions to migration-induced neighbourhood changes. Moreover, this begs specific questions that are being addressed by population geographers (e.g. Clark, 2016) , such as:
• Is there less conflict and resistance from settled populations to increasing levels of migration in more historically, dynamic, socially-diverse neighbourhoods compared to more stable, socially-homogenous ones?
• Do the characteristics of specific migrant groups (i.e. language, dress, etc.) and / or established populations have a bearing on how migrants are 'accepted' and integrated into local neighbourhoods?
• Are the effects of migration experienced and perceived differently within diverse places on the rural-urban hierarchy?
• What are the effects of population density and scale (e.g. physical distance
to the nearest neighbourhood with high proportions of migrants) on perceptions of migration?
Recent scholarship has clearly made progress here in deepening knowledge of population processes that are reshaping geographic patterns of segregation and diversity, with a prominent focus on ethnicity and race.
Noteworthy are the contributions of Ellis, Wright, and colleagues in the USA. 
IV. Conclusion
In this my second report, I have outlined Population Geography scholarship that has progressed understandings of local population compositions, with a focus on changing patterns of segregation and diversity. I have contended that this scholarship is important for more fully understanding the differential effects of migration on local communities and neighbourhoods. This provides a gateway for Population Geography to more fully engage with debates about the contested links between the effects of migration and neighbourhood change, such as the debates tied to the Brexit referendum and the USA Presidential election. The silence of Population Geographers in these debates suggests that the sub-discipline could enhance the way that knowledge is exchanged with politicians, policy makers, the media and other stakeholders. As a starting point, there may be value in the sub-discipline reflecting on the following contentions that Population Geography may be:
• Addressing the 'wrong' kinds of research questions that are not of relevance to politicians, policy makers and the media
• Delivering the 'wrong' answers (albeit evidence-based) that policy makers 'do not want to hear', or do not chime with wider dominant political ideologies and priorities
• Employing the use of methods that are not viewed as being fully rigorous by policy makers, and producing an evidence-base that is challenged on the level of robustness
• Not effectively articulating and communicating research findings with nonacademic audiences, such as the over-inclusion of technical terms in policy briefings, and thus not effectively shaping public policy
• Lacking a high-profile, figure-head to champion the sub-discipline in the media and policy arenas.
• Experiencing the effects of a broader mistrust and lack of respect of academics by broader society and politicians.
Tellingly, it is notable that the Population Geography Research Group of the Royal Geographical Society recently launched a blog series with the aim: 'to promote timely and impactful dialogue on key political issues relating to population geography'. Positively, this suggests that many of the contentions, noted above, are digested and actioned by population geographers. When the next political debates on the effects of migration and social change are aired, Population Geography will be poised and ready to offer-up some empirically-grounded evidence to refute and / concur with political and media representations of migration.
